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Abstract Can Quine’s criterion for ontological commitment be comparatively applied
across different logics? If so, how? Cross-logical evaluations of discourses are cen-
tral to contemporary philosophy of mathematics and metaphysics. The focus here is
on the influential and important arguments of George Boolos and David Lewis that
second-order logic and plural quantification don’t incur additional ontological com-
mitments over and above those incurred by first-order quantifiers. These arguments are
challenged by the exhibition of a technical tool—the truncation-model construction of
notational equivalents—that compares the ontological role and increased expressive
strength of non-first-order ideology to first-order ideology.
1 The ethics of ontological commitment
Quine’s (1953) ethics of ontological commitment comes down to a simple principle
(one, however, with background assumptions as well as stages of application): if you
have to say it exists, then you’re committed to its existence. Quine specifies “saying
it exists” this way. What it is, that commits you to an entity e that is C, is ∃xCx in a
first-order (standard Tarskian objectual) interpreted language, where Cx is an arbitrary
well-formed formula of this language with at most x free, where what you have to say
is D; and ∃xCx logically (first-order) follows from D. This is Quine’s criterion for the
commitments of a discourse, D, or (for short) Quine’s criterion.1
1 As has become customary, I’m sloppy about “use and mention” while acknowledging that sloppiness.
I also breezily use the metaphor “say” and related words. The criterion applies to discourses; and these
don’t have to be said or uttered or anything like that to have ontological commitments. They do, however,
have to be meaningful. I make something of this requirement shortly.
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Ontological commitment is concerned with what we say in the vernacular, since we
always begin with theory or discourse that occurs in the vernacular (in mathematics, in
empirical science, or in ordinary life). According to the Quinean approach, however,
we’re not to take ourselves as definitively committed until the relevant bit of vernac-
ular speech has been recharacterized in first-order terms. (No claim is being made
that a first-order recharacterization of a bit of vernacular is straightforward, easy, or
uncontroversial.) In any case, the Quinean needn’t care how ontological commitment
is apparently conveyed in the vernacular itself—metaphorically, implicitly, explicitly,
contextually—it can even be that our methods of indicating ontological commitment
in the vernacular are hopelessly muddled.
Instead, and with Quine’s criterion, a clean first-order tool for recognizing onto-
logical commitment is given. A connection to the original vernacular speech remains
because the descriptive and inferential roles of the original speech are replicated by
first-order rendition—although never fully. Examples are, say, some applied rigorous-
informal mathematics or a characterization of the lineage of a kind of insect. Whatever
ontological readings we thought we detected (or thought we didn’t detect) in the origi-
nal speech, however, are set aside. We take seriously only the ontological commitments
that are revealed according to the criterion when it’s applied to the first-order rendition.
One red herring involves “explanation.” Some philosophers complain that Quine’s
criterion inappropriately favors singular terms over predicate expressions. Contrary
to straightforward applications of Quine’s criterion, these philosophers say, we must
explain what it is that red houses, red roses, and red sunsets have in common, and
doing that shows that a commitment to a property, attribute or trope  redness 
arises by merely claiming (for example) that roses are red.
Quine (1953, p. 10) is dubious about the explanatory value of such posited entities;
but, strictly speaking, whether they have any explanatory value is irrelevant to the
status of his criterion. If such an explanation is required—contrary to what Quine
thinks—and if it’s required, in particular, to explain commonalities like the redness of
red roses, red sunsets, and red houses, then quantification over these entities occurs
in whatever theory (of properties, attributes, or tropes, say) we have in which that
explanation is given. Such an explanation and theory isn’t given by saying, “Roses are
red,” or even “Roses and sunsets are red.” Quantification over these entities occurs,
perhaps, in our theory of the semantics of these expressions, or in the metaphysics
needed to explain why these sentences are true. Quine’s criterion is neutral about their
existence, as it should be. Specifically, we don’t need to treat predicates as tacitly
ontologically committing to accommodate the value of this kind of explanation.2
2 Boolos on the ontological role of plural and higher-order ideology
Quine’s criterion treats all the other idioms of an interpreted first-order formalism as
irrelevant to ontological commitment. That is, the predicates and logical connectives
in a first-order language are irrelevant to ontology. This isn’t a stipulation, as the dis-
cussion of predicates in the previous section already indicates. The thought is that an
2 See, e.g., Azzouni (2004, 2010).
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understanding of how predicates are involved in ontological commitment shows up
in its proper place, a place where we theorize about the semantic/metaphysical role
of predicates, and not when we simply use those predicates. So too with connectives.
Consider, for example, the connectives in a bit of doctrine—“John is running and
Sarah is jumping,” or “John is running only if Sarah is jumping.” Ontological commit-
ments aren’t taken to go beyond those sentences, of the form ∃xCx , that follow from
the first-order rendition of this doctrine. What guarantees this is the truth-functional
transparency of first-order logic.
This point about first-order formalisms is broadly (although by no means univer-
sally) accepted. Disputes emerge when attempting to transplant Quine’s criterion to
other formalisms. In particular, the most heated debates (“heat,” here, measured in the
strange unit of numbers of articles and books dedicated to the topic) have arisen over
plural quantification and monadic second-order quantification.
Some philosophers think that ideology (at least outside the first-order context) can
contribute to ontology as well.3 The debate is: how? And relatedly: how do we tell
what the ontological role of a particular bit of ideology is? Quine uses the following
secondary criterion for evaluating the ontological-commitment role of the ideology of
an alternative logic: render that ideology in an interpreted first-order formalism, and
see what else (in first-order terms) it’s committed to.4
Two important points. First, what I’m calling “the secondary criterion” only extends
Quine’s view of ontological commitment in the vernacular to non-first-order ideology.
The vernacular, he thinks, is no place to directly evaluate ontological commitments.
Quine takes the same view of non-first-order discourses.
Second, one can ask: Why stress interpreted first-order formalisms? Answer:
Because only sentences that say things have ontological commitments. Couple this
truism with Quine’s assumption that quantifier commitments are ontologically rele-
vant only when those quantifiers are objectual, and Tarskian models (or something
equivalent) emerge as the mechanism of interpretation.
A proponent of the strict Quinean criterion is committed both to (i) Quine’s criterion,
and (ii) Quine’s secondary criterion. Notice that this individuates Quine’s criterion—
to begin with—as something applied to discourses in the vernacular. (This is the only
application Quine discusses in his (1953)). I’m therefore treating Quine’s secondary
criterion as a broadening of the first criterion to encompass discourses in the language
of one or another alternative logic.5
3 E.g., Shapiro (1997), p. 54.
4 Quine (1970, p. 66), using this first-order-rendition methodology, describes higher-order logic as “just
set theory in sheep’s clothing.”
In an earlier version of this paper, I used “translate” instead of “render,” but that’s misleading as a referee
has made clear to me. As with the vernacular, Quine isn’t interested in meaning- or (full) truth-condition-
preservation, or other niceties that one might expect from a ‘translation.” This is one of the objections
Boolos raises to Quine’s first-order rendering of higher-order logic, as I’ll indicate later in this section.
Rendering is an optimal (but not perfect) first-order capture of the various expressive/logical properties of
the non-first-order target.
5 A referee has suggested a different way to characterize Quine’s criterion: No need for first-order rendi-
tion; just look at what’s quantified over in the first-order fragment of the discourse in question. Then the
criterion applies straightaway both to the vernacular and to discourses in certain alternative logical systems.
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The strict Quinean criterion, to put it mildly, hasn’t wide appeal. Philosophers,
among them, Boolos (1984, 1985); Field (1980, 1989); Lewis (1991), and van Inwagen
(1990), embrace their favorite non-first-order formalisms, but then deny that theories
in these formalisms incur the ontological commitments that first-order renderings of
them have.
Noting that this secondary criterion isn’t justified by virtue of accepting Quine’s
criterion, Boolos (1985, p. 78) writes:
We ought to recall that logicians have devoted attention to quantifiers other than
the usual for all x and for some x. Among these less familiar quantifiers, which
cannot be defined by means of the apparatus of first-order logic, are for most x,
for infinitely many x, for uncountably many x, and for at least as many x as there
are objects (in the domain). To claim that a statement to the effect that there are
infinitely many objects of a certain kind, made with the aid of the quantifier for
infinitely many x, implies the existence (on the customary acceptation of those
words) of an (infinite) class solely on the ground that the only way to utilize more
familiar logical vocabulary to eliminate the unfamiliar quantifier is to employ a
quantifier ranging over classes is to invite the response: what makes first-order
logic the touchstone by which the ontological or existential commitments of
these statements are to be assessed? The statements do not appear to commit us
to classes; why believe that it is their translation into the notation of first-order
logic augmented with variables ranging over classes that determines what they
are actually committed to?6
Boolos is not challenging Quine’s criterion. His arguments are meant to support a
conservative version of Quine’s criterion, at least with respect to plural-quantification
formalisms and higher-order logic: treat only the first-order quantifiers as indicating
ontological commitment even when they occur in a formalism accompanied by other
non-first-order idioms.7 He is challenging Quine’s offered method of evaluating the
ontological commitments of theories utilizing non-first-order idioms: rendering those
theories in a pure (interpreted) first-order formalism; he’s challenging Quine’s strict
criterion.
Footnote 5 continued
But this isn’t a good way to initially think about Quine’s criterion for at least two reasons. First, it doesn’t
sensibly apply to the vernacular at all since, without a well-understood empirical characterization of the
syntax of the vernacular (which we lack), the first-order fragment isn’t well defined. Second, it’s not prima
facie suitable for non-first-order logics, since Quine’s criterion is supposed to evaluate the ontological
commitments of entire discourses, and the first order fragment of a discourse doesn’t indicate what the rest
of the discourse is doing ontologically. A supplementary argument that the other idioms of the discourse are
ontologically innocent is needed. As I’ll show later, arguments to establish what amounts to this suggestion—
against Quine’s secondary criterion—are offered by Boolos and other philosophers.
6 See Field (1980), pp. 94–5, where the same argument uses instead the There is finitely many quantifier.
7 Boolos (1984, p. 72) writes, when speaking of discourse with both first- and second-order quantifiers,
that: “Ontological commitment is carried by our first-order quantifiers; a second-order quantifier needn’t
be taken to be a kind of first-order quantifier in disguise, having items of a special kind, collections, in its
range.” On Boolos’ view: ∃X∃x X x is committed only to there being a (first-order) entity—not to there
being a second-order entity that holds of the first-order entity. This view contrasts with Shapiro (1985), for
example, who accepts that the second-order existential quantifier is committing just as the first-order one is.
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In any case (as Boolos also points out), the Quinean suggestion of evaluating
ontological commitments of theories (or non-first-order formalisms themselves) by
first-order rendition looks misguided (and not merely unjustified). To take higher-
order logic as an example, the rendition in first-order set theory that Quine urges,
replacing “Fx” with “x ∈ α,” and quantifying on the set-theoretic variable “α”
rather than on the predicate “F,” doesn’t preserve the important and apparently rel-
evant metalogical properties of the original formalism. First off, higher-order logic
looks genuinely like logic—in particular it’s an uninterpreted formalism requiring
models to make its sentences (fully) meaningful. Like first-order logic, it introduces
a division between logical constants and other terms. As a result, one studies the
models (the interpretations) of theories in the language of higher-order logic just as
one studies the models of theories in the language of first-order logic. One proves,
for example, that completeness and Löweinheim–Skolem fail, although both are
true of first-order logic. As Boolos (1975, pp. 39–40) stresses, higher-order logic—
looking rather like a logic, looking rather like first-order logic in particular—has
validities such as ∃X∀x X x , but these aren’t rendered as truths of set theory, say
ZFC.
First-order set theory—to press these differences further—is an entirely different
beast. It’s a fully interpreted formalism—with sentences—not a system of (partially
uninterpreted) formulas. It has nonstandard models, of course—but this is hardly the
same thing as uninterpreted theories of higher-order logic needing models to supply
them with interpretations. And, anyway, the previous observations show that they don’t
share the same models—not by a long shot. It’s simply not obvious, therefore, that
the ontological commitments of interpreted higher-order logics should be evaluated
by those of a first-order set theory, as Quine suggests.
The problem is quite general, applying to all the examples of non-first-order ideol-
ogy that Quine would apply his rendition method to, some of which Boolos mentions
in the quotation I gave earlier. But rejecting Quine’s secondary criterion leaves us
without a general and systematic method to compare the ontological commitments
of theories across formalisms.8 The result is that Boolos (and other philosophers)
fall back on natural-language intuitions about whether natural-language analogues
of non-first-order ideology introduce ontological commitments, as well as the occa-
sional argument (as we’ll see in Sect. 6). Thus, debates about whether plural quan-
tification introduces ontological commitments over and above first-order logic are
unresolvable precisely because there is currently no way of systematically compar-
ing ontological commitments across logics—in particular, between first-order logic
and non-first-order competitors—other than Quine’s contested (and widely rejected)
first-order rendition technique. These debates, furthermore, are given extra philosoph-
ical angst because plural quantifiers (in particular) have been widely adopted by a
generation or more of mainstream metaphysicians to motivate the cogency of meta-
physical positions that aren’t possible in first-order terms (because they’re undercut
by first-order indispensability arguments).9 As I’ve just mentioned, without a techni-
8 We would have such a method if the suggestion of footnote 5 could be made to fly. But it can’t.
9 Two early influential examples: Lewis 1991 and van Inwagen 1990. Both philosophers (Lewis explic-
itly and van Inwagen implicitly—via Lewis’s authority) accept Boolos’ claim that plural quantification
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cally justified method of comparing ontological commitments across formalisms, we
have only the tool of natural-language ontological-commitment intuitions about the
sentences in question; and Boolos wields this tool with admirable rhetorical power,
when he writes (1984, p. 72), speaking of some Cheerios in a bowl:
There are, of course, quite a lot of Cheerios in the bowl, well over two hundred
of them. But is there, in addition to the Cheerios, also a set of them all? And what
about the >1060 subsets of that set? (And don’t forget the sets of sets of Cheerios
in the bowl.) It is haywire to think that when you have some Cheerios, you are
eating a set—what you’re doing is: eating THE CHEERIOS. Maybe there are
some reasons for thinking there is such a set—there are, after all, >1060 ways to
divide the Cheerios into two portions—but it doesn’t follow just from the fact
that there are some Cheerios in the bowl that, as some who theorize about the
semantics of plural would have it, there is also a set of them all.
This is, essentially, the same point Black (1971, p. 615) makes some years earlier.
Black first quotes Halmos (1960, p. 1): “A pack of wolves, a bunch of grapes, or a
flock of pigeons are all examples of sets of things,” and then he adds sarcastically: “It
ought then to make sense, at least sometimes, to speak of being pursued by a set, or
eating a set, or putting a set to flight.”
Although this is compelling rhetoric, it’s still just rhetoric—based ultimately only
on the sheer intuitive oddity of saying things in the vernacular like “I’m eating a set,”
“I’m chasing a set,” or “I’m scared of that (evil) set.” We need definitive tools to
adjudicate this debate.
3 Equivalence
The point of this paper is to justify a different method of evaluating the ontological-
commitment role of non-first-order ideology, a method without the drawbacks that
Boolos and others have exposed in Quine’s first-order-rendition method. Here’s how
I’ll present this method. First, in this section, I’ll present Equivalence,10 the principle
that notationally-equivalent logics have the same ontological commitments. I’ll then
describe, in Sect. 4, a disagreement in the literature about the legitimacy of the addi-
tional expressive strength of theories in higher-order logics over first-order theories,
and I’ll illustrate the technical details of the truncation-model method of constructing
notationally-equivalent logics by applying it to the logics involved in this debate. I’ll
then turn to plural quantification in Sect. 5.
Consider logics L and L*, and model-theoretic semantics, M and M* respectively,
for those logics. It’s pretty standard to understand a semantics (a Tarskian-style seman-
tics, say) as giving interpretations for the sentences couched in the formalism of that
Footnote 9 continued
introduces no additional ontological commitments above and beyond singular first-order quantifiers. To say,
for example, “There are some apples on the table,” or “There are some molecules arranged chairlike,” is to
be committed (respectively) to individual apples or individual molecules, and nothing more. I discuss this
in Sect. 5.
10 Thanks to a referee for this term.
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logic—as I’ve been doing all along. Accepting this, we can describe L/M and L*/M*
as notational equivalents if there is a mapping, IM L that’s one-to-one between the
models of M and M*, and one-to-one between the sentences of L and L*, so that if a
sentence S of L is true-in a model m, then its image IM L(S) is true-in IM L(m).
Notice that, given appropriate proof-theoretic choices (ones compatible with IM L ’s
mapping of the sentences), IM L preserves all the significant metalogical properties,
for example, whether the interplay between the Ls and Ms induces essential incom-
pleteness, details about expressive strength, and so on. The proponent of the syntactic
ethics grounding Quine’s criterion should accept (therefore) that L/M and L*/M*
share their ontological commitments—whatever they are. The reason is that the onto-
logical commitments of a theory (in a logic) should supervene on the relationship of
that logic to its semantics. Quine, specifically, repeatedly stresses that his first-order
criterion is intrinsically related to the semantics of first-order logic being objectual.11
Call Equivalence the principle that any two logics isomorphic in the above sense are
equivalent in their ontology-inducing capacities.
Equivalence allows an in-principle tool to measure exactly what the ideology of
a non-first-order logic introduces over and above a first-order formalism—and, in
particular, a tool independent of the puzzling issues surrounding first-order rendition.
Start with some non-first-order L/M , and construct a notational variant of it, L*/M*,
and an appropriate IM L , by doing one or more of the following to an initially-given
first-order formalism: (i) introducing additional logical constants into the formalism,
(ii) restricting the admissible models, (iii) restricting the admissible expressions of
the language of that formalism. Whatever additional ontological commitments L*/M*
induces beyond those of the first-order formalism it was constructed from can be
imputed to that L/M by virtue of its notational equivalence to L*/M*. More generally,
all the ways that L/M differs from first-order formalisms in expressive capacities can
be evaluated by the construction, via (i)–(iii), of L*/M*.
Although Quine’s rendition method yields first-order renditions, notice that Equiv-
alence doesn’t. The result of an application of Equivalence, a first-order formalism
supplemented with logical constants that’s in addition restricted in its language and/or
model theory—is not first-order. To repeat: Its differences from a first-order formalism
with standard models can be precisely measured by its construction via (i)–(iii).
Equivalence, perhaps, allows an Alston (1958)-style rejoinder: L/M hasn’t the
additional “now-exposed” ontological commitments of L*/M*; rather, L*/M* has the
narrower-construed ontological commitments of L/M . After all, by assumption, the
formalisms are notational equivalents. The response: Recall the rules of the game.
This paper attacks those who accept Quine’s criterion when applied to first-order
logics, but who reject Quine’s strict criterion (as Boolos, Lewis, van Inwagen, and
many others do): who think accepting Quine’s criterion is compatible with it being
soundly applicable to non-first-order formalisms, such as higher-order logics, plural-
quantification formalisms, etc.12
11 This commitment is made polemically by him to officially contrast his attitude to substitutional quantifi-
cation, where “all ontological bets are off.” See, e.g., Quine (1974). In this discussion, he commits himself
to Tarskian model theory, in addition to doing so in other relevant contexts, e.g., Quine (1970).
12 My thanks for an anonymous referee for urging a response to this Alston-style rejoinder.
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Recap. I first characterized Quine’s strict criterion this way: apply it to an inter-
preted first-order formalism or first-order render your target formalism, and identify its
commitments with those of the rendition. The Boolosian rejoinder is that so-rendering
demotes non-first-order logical idioms to interpreted non-logical first-order ideology,
and that distorts their philosophically-relevant properties—notably their metalogical
properties. The strict-criterion proponent retorts: I accept your objection. But now I
demand an application of Equivalence. For only by determining how your non-first-
order logical formalism goes beyond first-order resources can we evaluate whether or
not additional ontology is induced.
I treat Equivalence as a friendly amendment to the strict Quinean criterion: Equiva-
lence replaces “rendition in an interpreted first-order formalism.” I now turn to apply-
ing Equivalence to monadic second-order logic.
4 Measuring the role of ideology in ontology: the model-truncation recipe and
its application to monadic second-order logic
A (still-living) topic in philosophy of mathematics is referential access to mathemat-
ical entities. A version of a worry about this is that first-order theories (because of
Löweinheim–Skolem theorems) have non-standard models of varying cardinalities.
One is concerned, naturally enough, that therefore it isn’t possible to refer to and only
to the intended model by means of a first-order number theory (however axiomati-
cally rich) because any such theory has not just an intended model but numerous other
ones of arbitrary cardinality (and far richer structure). This problem can be tamed—up
to model-isomorphism—by using instead monadic second-order logic with standard
(nonHenkin) semantics. A debate arises, therefore, about whether deserting the first-
order context legitimately secures reference (modulo isomorphism) to the standard
model of arithmetic. Shapiro (1985), for example, claims that second-order logical
theories don’t illegitimately presuppose a greater referential grip on pertinent mathe-
matical objects than appropriate, although this is true for theories couched in ω-logic.13
First-order proponents were concerned with the following issue: the additional
resources that second-order logic seems to have to rule out non-standard model
aren’t legitimate. I won’t revisit this debate,14 but instead note two points. First, the
issue isn’t—strictly—about ontological commitments; it’s about expressive strength.
Model-theoretic options that first-order theories can’t descriptively rule out are appar-
ently ruled out by theories couched in higher-order logics. The debate-question is:
13 ω-logic supplements standard logic with an additional quantifier that ranges over the natural numbers.
Shapiro (1985, p. 733) writes that ω-languages “cannot be used to show, illustrate, or characterize how the
natural number structure is itself understood, grasped, or communicated,” since “they assume or presuppose
the natural numbers.”At that time, Shapiro claimed that he took second-order logic not to exhibit this vice
of assuming or presupposing the natural numbers: he took its semantics to be legitimately adequate to
axiomatizing arithmetic, real and complex analysis, etc., in contrast to the semantics of first-order languages
(Shapiro 1985, pp. 714–715). He has subsequently denied claiming this, however, in Shapiro (1999),
specifically p. 58. Post-1985 Shapiro, in any case, has weakened his brief for the value of higher-order
logics, recently writing (Shapiro 2012, p. 305) that “second-order languages, with standard model-theoretic
semantics, have important roles to play in foundational studies.”
14 See Azzouni (1994). See Shapiro (1999), for further discussion.
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what is it about theories couched in second-order logic that enables this? Second,
my present aim, in any case, is to illustrate a recipe for measuring differences in for-
mal theories couched in different logics. Along the way, comparison techniques for
ontological commitments are introduced too.
So, consider a second-order monadic predicate calculus containing n-place predi-
cate symbols; but where second-order quantification is only one-place. And presume
a standard semantics (all the subsets of the domain are implicitly ranged over by the
second-order quantifiers). More specifically, consider a two-sorted-variable second-
order language: ∀x, ∃x,∀X, ∃X , with individual constants: a, b, c, …, individual
variables, x, y, z, . . ., various n-place predicate constants: P, Q, R, …, and (one-place)
predicate variables, X, Y, Z , . . .. Accompany this with a standard second-order (non-
Henkin) semantics, in particular, with standard models As. That’s L/M .
I now construct L*/M* from a set of first-order languages with standard Tarskian
model theory. I call the forthcoming logic (2m)truncated logic.15 To construct it,
we restrict both the admissible models and the admissible sentences of an initial first-
order language. The vocabulary of the language we start from has standard quantifiers,
∀x, ∃x , individual constants: a, b, c, …, individual variables, x, y, z, . . ., n-place pred-
icate constants: P, Q, R, …. First, introduce two distinguished predicates, “S” and “E,”
deemed additional logical constants. That is, they are reinterpreted across models in
constrained ways. Consider the set of sentences SS that’s constructed using the stan-
dard formation rules from this vocabulary. That’s not the set of sentences of L*. L*,
instead, is the image of the mapping IL of the sentences of L into SS. I’ll indicate
details about IL once other aspects of the to-be-constructed L*/M* are given.
The model theory M* contains only certain highly-structured first-order models m*.
First, the domain dm∗ of any such model m* is bifurcated: its domain dm∗ = d ∪ Pd.
An interpretation (a (2m)truncated model m*) of SS (the first-order language+{E, S})
in any (2m)truncated domain is the same as for standard first-order theories, except: (i)
in each model, the one-place predicate “S” is mapped to Pd, the one-place predicate
“E” is mapped to {(a, b) | a ∈ b & a ∈ d & b ∈ Pd}, and (ii) the extensions and anti-
extensions of the other predicates and relations are restricted to d. Importantly, this
includes identity. Call these (2m)truncated models.
To proceed, I must present the above-mentioned mapping IL of the sentences of
L into SS. This mapping treats this version of second-order logic as a two-sorted
first-order logic, and relativizes the two sets of quantifiers to one.16 Specifically,
occurrences of higher-order quantifiers (∀X). . .X . . ., (∃X). . .X . . ., are replaced by
(∀x)(Sx → . . .x . . .) and (∃x)(Sx & . . .x . . .), respectively. Occurrences of first-order
quantifiers (∀x). . .x . . ., (∃x). . .x . . ., are replaced by (∀x)(¬Sx → . . .x . . .), and
(∃x)(¬Sx & . . .x . . .), respectively. (A corresponding mapping is in place for the indi-
vidual constants.) Lastly, all instances of predication, where a higher-order variable
appears, Y t, are replaced with EtY . IL is a mapping of L properly into SS (many
sentences are left out). L* is the image of IL(L).
15 This is what I called it in Azzouni (1994), § 3, where I first gave this construction. I called it this because
(as I will subsequently show) this (restricted) language, as it’s interpreted by the introduced model theory,
is a notational equivalent of second-order monadic logic with standard semantics.
16 See van Benthem and Doets (1983).
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Notice that, along with IL , I’ve also implicitly given a 1-1 mapping of the (standard)
models of monadic second-order logic to the models of (2m)truncated model theory.
Any model m of monadic second-order logic with a domain e is mapped to that model
m* of (2m)truncated model theory induced by letting d = e, and holding fixed the
interpretations of the nonlogical vocabulary of L in e.17 So I’ve exhibited the needed
IM L .
The interesting (and relevant) metalogical properties, e.g., versions of completeness,
compactness, and Löweinheim–Skolem, arise from the interplay of the model theory
and the language of the logic under study. It’s easy to show monadic second-order
logic plus standard semantics has the same metalogical properties that (2m)truncated
logic has. Specifically, compactness, Löweinheim–Skolem, and completeness fail,
and the two logics have identical capacities to characterize infinite structures. They
are notational variants in the required sense.18
Important to evaluating how monadic second-order logic goes beyond first-order
resources is seeing what can be said in both monadic second-order logic and
(2m)truncated logic, and as importantly, seeing what can’t be said in both monadic
second-order logic and (2m)truncated logic. First, two examples of the sayable.
Consider the second-order induction schema for PA.19
∀X ([X0 & ∀x(X x → Xsx)] → ∀x X x).
This corresponds to
∀x(Sx → ([¬S0 & E0x & ∀y(¬Sy → (Eyx → Esyx))] → ∀y(¬Sy → Eyx))).
Consider next a second-order formulation of a relation R being well founded:
∀X [∃x(X x → ∃x(X x & ∀y(X y → ¬Rxy)))].
This corresponds to
∀z(Sz → [∃x(¬Sx & Exz → ∃x(¬Sx & Exz & ∀y(¬Sy → (Eyz → ¬Ryx))))]).
As I mentioned, it’s equally significant that certain things can’t be said, things that
are least syntactically sayable in the sense that they are sentences of SS but not of L*.
17 Two small technical matters about the definition of true-in for L*/M*. First, the truth-clauses for model
m* take account of the interpretation of the items of Pd as subsets of d. This enables the (2m)truncation-
capture of monadic second-order quantifier-instantiation to predicate constants. Second, the truth-clauses
are defined for all sentences in SS, and the values of sentences outside the image of IL are discarded. It’s
shown by a standard induction that if a sentence S of L is true-in a model m of M , then IM L (S) is true-in
IM L (m).
18 Meta-Proof sketch: Pick your favorite metalogical property of monadic second-order logic. Its proof
turns on the interplay of the language/particular-proof-theory of monadic second-order logic L with its
model-theory M . Using IM L , every step of the proof can be replicated. Notice in particular, that any
proof-procedure applicable to L corresponds to a proof-procedure applicable to L* via the mapping IL .
19 A function symbol appears in the two formulas to follow. It can be treated as language defined from
predicates or the earlier characterizations of L and L* can be modified to include functions.
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The unsayable graphically illustrates the ways monadic higher-order logic is restricted
in its expressive powers. Here are two examples.20
(∀x)(Sx ∨ ¬Sx)
(∀x)(∀y)(Sx & Sy → (x = y ↔ (∀z)(Ezx ↔ Ezy))).
The first statement asserts the logical truth, in (2m)truncated logic, that everything
is either a set or not. The second statement asserts the extensionality property that
holds of the items in Pd. The reason for these bits of censorship—and others like
them—isn’t far to seek. Monadic second-order logic is severely restricted in what it
can say about the items it second-order quantifies over (and thus, correspondingly,
(2m)truncated logic is similarly gagged). This is indicated in monadic second-order
logic by what’s sayable—as it were—about these things involving only second-order
quantifiers. Specifically, the n-place predicates are (implicitly) barred from ranging
over anything other than the members (or instances) of what the second-order quanti-
fiers range over. This is explicitly captured in (2m)truncated logic by the corresponding
restriction that the extensions and anti-extensions of the n-place predicates, including
identity, are constrained to d, the individual constants hold only of items in d, and the
n-place predicates and individual constants occur only within the scope of “¬S.”21
These expressive limitations are due, however, to monadic second-order logic being
monadic and second-order. My purpose in stressing them now has largely been to
illustrate the power and flexibility of the truncation-model approach to non-first-order
formalisms—and in particular, the adaptability of the methods (i)–(iii), of constructing
notational variants, to non-first-order peculiarities. I’ll mostly leave aside mentioning
expressive limitations in the polemical discussion (about ontological commitments
and expressive strength) that follows.
Let’s turn, therefore, to how we should regard the supplementations to first-order
logic that yield (2m)truncated logic. First-order logic allows arbitrary domains—
except for the exclusion of the empty domain. Any model of (2m)truncated theory, by
contrast, is not arbitrary: the domains of these models are bifurcated into “urlements”
and all the subsets of the set of urlements.22
Directly related to the increased expressive strength of (2m)truncated logic (and
consequently to the increased expressive strength of second-order monadic logic) is
(i) the logical constant “S” distinguishing between set-like items and urlement-like
items in any model of (2m)truncated logic, and (ii) the logical constant “E” that
characterizes “is a member of” relations between the urlement-like elements and the
20 My thanks to a referee for stressing this neat example.
21 Notice that these last remarks show that we can characterize the language L* directly (and independently)
of the mapping IL (L). This is important to notice (as a referee has stressed to me) because otherwise another
version of the Alston argument can arise: namely L* is parasitic on L , and so inherits L’s ontological
commitments. Because second-order quantification is innocent, L* doesn’t convict L of any commitments
beyond those carried by L’s first-order quantifiers.
22 I use “subset” (and, earlier, “set”) because these are easy terms to reach for in these contexts. I’ll raise




set-like elements. In using phrases like “urelement-like” and “set-like” I’m indicating
that these relationships are relative to the model: They don’t target whatever set-
theoretical relations occur among the items in d (which are urelements according to
the model theory).
Some are tempted, nevertheless, to describe (2m)truncated logic as “set theory.”
If “theory” in “set theory” is meant seriously, this should be resisted. We can say
very little about these sets. This is perhaps already directly noticeable by looking at
monadic second-order logic; but it’s completely transparent in (2m)truncated logic—if
only because of the many sentences of SS excluded from L*. Indeed, monadic second-
order logic—all on its own—looks like a natural generalization of first-order logic: we
quantify into predicate positions just as we first-order quantify into individual-constant
positions. But its notational equivalent, (2m)truncated logic, reveals the artificialities.
We quantify over things rather like sets, and not, say, like proper classes. But, never-
theless, there are no predicates that hold of them. Totally weird.23
It’s clear, despite the foregoing, why set-theoretic phenomena intrude into the
semantic properties of (2m)truncated logic, and thus correspondingly into the seman-
tic properties of monadic second-order logic. In any case, and very importantly, the
additional logical constants introduce expressive strength simply because it’s now
possible to eliminate models altogether that would be available otherwise.
The roles of “E” and “S” are explicit in (2m)truncated logic, and so it would be
hard to argue that shifting from first-order logic to (2m)truncated logic is innocent,
in the sense (to paraphrase Shapiro (1985, p. 733)) that (2m)truncated logic doesn’t
“assume or presuppose the natural numbers.” The notation presupposes something a lot
stronger. What makes it easy to think that monadic second-order logic doesn’t assume
or presuppose something (equivalent or superior in strength to) the natural numbers?
One thing is that the roles of “E” and “S” are hidden in monadic second-order logic.
In first-order logic, the concatenation of a (one-place) predicate “P” with a constant
“a,” as in “Pa,” needn’t be taken to contain an (implicit) representation of some sort
of membership relation. But when we quantify (standardly) into the predicate posi-
tion, as we do in monadic second-order logic, this is how syntactic concatenation of
individual terms with predicate terms must be understood (as the notational equiva-
lence of (2m)truncated logic with monadic second-order logic shows). Further, and
this is striking (or ought to be), syntactic concatenation of one-place predicates with
constants in the monadic second-order context can’t be reinterpreted across models—
as the notational equivalence to (2m)truncated logic also indicates—it’s therefore an
(implicit) logical constant.24
23 Don’t trivialize the question whether (2m)truncation logic is a theory of sets—and therefore, corre-
spondingly, the question whether monadic second-order logic is—by thinking that there are all sorts of
set theories, including quite weak ones, and so, of course it is. There are two issues, first, whether what
can be said about sets in these languages is enough to call the result “set theory,” the issue just explored.
But, second, there is whether the relations that the items in Pd bear to the items in d are sufficient to call
the items in Pd “sets.” I explore this briefly in the next section. My thanks to a referee for prompting this
footnote.
24 Notice its role shows up in two ways in (2m)truncated logic. First, predication is explicitly replaced by
E, when a second-order variable is involved, but second, in any (2m)truncated model, predicate constants
are linked to specific items in Pd by the definition of true-in. (See footnote 17.)
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A second way that second-order monadic logic misleads. Second-order quantifiers
under the standard interpretation not only range over all the subsets relativized to
the domain, but also only over such objects. This is enabled by two peculiar facts
about second-order quantifiers and their model theory: (i) they quantify into predicate
places, and (ii) their range is only implicitly given—that is, what they range over
appears nowhere in the domain. But when we isomorphically map monadic second-
order logic over to (2m)truncated first-order logic, everything (and “something” too)
becomes terminologically transparent. When the (2m)truncated first-order quantifiers
mimic the second-order quantifiers under the standard interpretation, they are explic-
itly fixed by logical-constant predicates that hold of part of the domain (in every
(2m)truncated model). The notation (and this is made explicit in (2m)truncated logic)
has the expressive capacity to focus on part of what there is in a domain to the exclusion
of other things there are in that domain.
Let’s return to how the natural-number structure (in Shapiro’s (1985) words) is itself
“understood, grasped, or communicated.” Compare first-order Peano arithmetic with
the (2m)truncated-logic version of monadic second-order Peano arithmetic (hereafter
(2m)Peano arithmetic). Relevant to the comparison isn’t merely, from the point of
view of the (2m)truncated models, that in addition to the numbers that are quantified
over, the members of the powerset of those numbers are also quantified over. Far
more important is that the membership relations between the numbers and the items
containing them are preserved (by the logical constancy of “E” and “S”) across all
possible (2m)truncated models of (2m)Peano arithmetic. It’s this, of course, that gives
(2m)Peano arithmetic (and therefore, via its notational equivalence, monadic second-
order Peano arithmetic) the expressive capacity to exclude the (2m)truncated models
that would correspond to the non-standard models of first-order Peano arithmetic. As a
result, describing second-order Peano arithmetic as not inappropriately presupposing
the natural numbers (contrary to ω-logic) misses the point of the objection that second-
order Peano arithmetic has illegimately greater expressive powers. (It’s a second red
herring.) The focus should be on the introduced logical constants, and their legitimacy.
An easy conclusion: Only if someone thinks it’s legitimate to: (i) restrict the arbi-
trary models of first-order logic as it’s done in (2m)truncated logic, and (ii) stipulate
additional logical strength by means of logical constants, like “E” and “S,” should that
someone think adopting monadic second-order logic offers a solution to the question of
how the natural number structure is itself “understood, grasped, or communicated.”25
25 See Azzouni 1994, § 3, footnote 20, and surrounding material, for details on generalizing the truncation-
model method to full second-order logic. Similar techniques can be used on various generalized-quantifier
logics that Boolos alludes to (in the quotation I’ve given). A technical question arises: How general is the
model-truncation method? It seems quite general, actually, as already indicated. Consider, for example, a
modal formalism with (classical language) possible-world semantics. The first step of the truncation-model
recipe uses the truth-conditions of the modal formalism to capture that modal formalism in an interpreted
first-order language. This yields a significant increase in ideology: not just “α is in world β” but also new
non-logical predicates (corresponding to the non-logical predicates in the original modal formalism) with
additional places for worlds. The second step transforms this new ideology into a set of logical constants
corresponding to a restricted set of first-order models, as well as a restriction of the set of admissible
sentences expressible in that ideology. (My thanks to one of the referees for asking about generalizations
of the model-truncation method.) Notice that a dramatic “uncovering of hidden ontology” doesn’t really
occur in the modal case as it does with higher-order logics. This is because the possible-world semantics of
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5 An application of the model-truncation recipe to plural quantifiers
Assume we have a theory of some sort, or (more vaguely and uncontroversially) a way
of describing ordinary objects, such as furniture. We talk about chairs, for example,
and describe some of their properties—they’re artifacts for example, most of them
have four legs, they’re composed of atoms, etc. Call this (indeterminately large) set of
statements Dv. We speak in the vernacular about these things (Dv is a set of statements
of the vernacular), but on one or another implementation of the Quinean ontological
strategy, we reframe Dv as Df : the statements in the vernacular are reconstrued in one
or another first-order logical framework. The ethics of Quinean commitment forces
the following paraphrase condition: If (∃x)C is a consequence of Df , then by virtue
of a commitment to the truth of the statements of Df , a commitment to C-entities is
incurred unless it’s possible to reformulate Df as Df∗, where (∃x)C isn’t a consequence
of Df∗, and where—for the purposes the discourse Dv is put to—Df∗ is as good as Df .
So consider this particular debate in contemporary metaphysics.26 The “metaphys-
ical nihilist” claims that only metaphysical simples exist. A chair isn’t a metaphysical
simple, so the metaphysical nihilist denies chairs. The immediate worry is that the
metaphysical-nihilist has to deny Quine’s criterion too because we need Dv, here
understood as discourse about chairs, and the first-order reconstrual (Df) of Dv has
chair-commitments, codified by apparently true statements like (∃x)Cx—(“there are
chairs”). This is an indispensability argument. Without an alternative item as useful
as Dv, Quinean discourse-ethics commit speakers to chairs. I’ll assume (along with
most of the metaphysics literature) that if one restricts oneself to first-order standard
quantifiers (“singular first-order quantifiers”) with standard (Tarskian) semantics, one
can’t avoid the chair-commitments that metaphysical nihilists don’t want.
Plural quantifiers to the rescue. We have an alternative plural-quantifier reconstrual
of Dv, (∃xx)C∗xx , where C* applied to a plural variable means: “arranged chairlike.”
Given plural quantifers, we can restrict the range of our (plural) quantifiers to simples:
we don’t have (or need) a commitment to chairs, so it seems, because “Arranged-
chairlike” enables plural-quantified sentences to do the work whenever, if we restricted
ourselves to first-order quantifiers, we would instead need statements like (∃x)Cx—
“there is a chair.” Wherever speakers, restricted to first-order singular quantifiers, have
to describe there being a chair, speakers who utilizes first-order plural quantifiers need
only be committed to the simples that compose that chair, saying instead, “there are
simples arranged chairwise.” The idea, therefore, is that restricting the range of the
plural quantifier variables to simples suffices for ordinary talk of artifacts of all sorts.
Footnote 25 continued
modal formalisms are already widely taken to introduce substantial additional ontology. Those philosophers,
however, who think that primitive modal idioms (coupled with Quine’s criterion) enables an escape from
unappealing ontological commitments can be challenged by the model-truncation method just as proponents
of higher-order logics are challenged. To treat modal idioms as primitives is to take them as part of logic.
Equivalence, therefore, is a legitimate demand proponents of both primitive modal idioms and higher-order
logics must meet, provided these proponents accept Quine’s criterion. I say more about this in Sect. 7.
26 I draw material from van Inwagen (1990, 2001), and from some of the subsequent literature on this
topic, e.g., Bennett (2009); Hudson (2001); Sider (2011); Wasserman (2013).
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And the metaphysical nihilist is vindicated—at least as far as Quine’s criterion is
concerned.27
Consider a pluralist language that’s equi-interpretable with monadic second-order
logic.28 Describe monadic second-order logic, therefore, as notationally equivalent
to the appropriate plural-language formalisms.29 Also accept, from Sect. 3, the
truncation-model method of constructing notational equivalents. This imports the com-
mitments imposed by the model theory of (2m)truncated logic to interpreted plural-
language statements. Consider, therefore, a bowl of Cheerios, and recall Boolos (1984,
p. 72)—here repeated:
There are, of course, quite a lot of Cheerios in the bowl, well over two hundred
of them. But is there, in addition to the Cheerios, also a set of them all? And what
about the >1060 subsets of that set? (And don’t forget the sets of sets of Cheerios
in the bowl.) It is haywire to think that when you have some Cheerios, you are
eating a set—what you’re doing is: eating THE CHEERIOS. Maybe there are
some reasons for thinking there is such a set—there are, after all, >1060 ways
to divide the Cheerios into two portions—but it doesn’t follow just from the fact
that there are some Cheerios in the bowl that, as some who theorize about the
semantics of plural would have it, there is also a set of them all.
We can now see why this is misleading. No (2m)truncated model forces a commitment
to sets of sets of anything. The powerset of a specific domain is one thing; the set-
theoretical hierarchy another. But still, does one eat a set of Cheerios? Does one run
from sets? Does one put sets to flight?
For that matter, does (2m)truncated model theory for monadic second-order logic
require sets at all? Of course not. Something is in the range of “S” in each (2m)truncated
model, and that something bears the right counter-relation (“E”) to the items plurally
quantified over; but nothing requires these things be sets, or that the counter-relation
be the inverse of set membership.
What else can they be? Well, whatever sorts of things that individual wolves, indi-
vidual grapes, etc., can be parts of, belong to, be part of the composition of, or whatever.
27 Much of the literature, e.g., Unger (e.g., 1980), avoids discussing Quine’s criterion and whether a nihilist
metaphysical position is compatible with it. van Inwagen (1990) is concerned with Quine’s criterion, but
uses plural quantification (on the basis of Lewis’ authority) while describing his meta-ontological position
(2001, pp. 3–4) so: “It is of the essence of my philosophy of quantification that first-order quantification
has no rivals and might just as well be called simply ‘quantification’.” Van Inwagen deviates from Lewis,
however: in the passage the previous quotation is from, he accepts Quine’s characterization of higher-order
logic as (in van Inwagen’s recharacterization) “attribute theory in sheep’s clothing,” as well as accepting, in
van Inwagen (1998), Quine’s purely first-order constraints. Van Inwagen’s position faces insurmountable
technical problems because of the equi-interpretability of monadic second-order logic with certain plural-
quantification formalisms. See what follows.
28 See Boolos (1984, 1985); Linnebo (2012), especially section 2.1.
29 Lewis (1991, pp. 70–71), notably, doesn’t challenge this identification, as a cursory reading might
seem to imply. He resists it only on the grounds that the identification will mislead (i) if someone thinks
second-order logic is disguised set theory (or property theory) because the identification will infect one’s
view of plural quantification as well, (ii) if someone falsely suggests plural quantification can be generalized
the way higher-order logic can, (iii) if someone falsely suggests polyadic plural quantification is equally
ontologically undemanding, and because (iv) it results in ugly English. None of these considerations bear
on the discussion here.
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Maybe I can’t be pursued by a set of wolves (because “set” after all, is coined termi-
nology), but I can certainly be pursued by a bunch of wolves, an aggregate of wolves,
or a lot of wolves. Furthermore, although I may not be particularly scared of any of
the individual wolves, I can certainly be scared (to death) of a pack of them. Maybe
packs are mereological sums. Maybe they’re “groups.” They’re certainly something
over and above the individual items in them, that’s not being denied—and that’s really
the point in debate about the ontological innocence of plural quantifiers. But only by
trivializing the word “set” can they be glibly characterized as sets.
So the singularist—as Lewis calls the opponent of the ontological innocence of
plural quantification—needn’t think that heaps of Cheerios (as in, “I’m eating a heap
of Cheerios”) are sets. But is a heap of Cheerios, a bunch of wolves, a flock of birds
anything more than the individual Cheerios, the individual wolves, or the individual
birds?
This last question betrays the fact that Boolos (and Black) rely on metaphysical intu-
itions that conflict with Quine’s ethics of ontological commitment, and that Boolos—at
least—is committed to. Any proponent of Quine’s criterion should respond this way:
Yes, I share your intuitions that, metaphysically speaking, there is nothing in that bowl
of Cheerios except for individual Cheerios. I don’t intuit (or see) a mereological sum
or bunch of Cheerios except insofar as I see a lot of Cheerios hanging out together in
a bowl. But those intuitions are irrelevant, just as irrelevant as when I say that “There
are Greek goddesses who are as prominent as Greek gods,” I have the accompanying
intuition that there are no Greek gods and goddesses. What’s relevant aren’t these
intuitions but what I need to say.
The truncation-model method shows that by employing plural quantification, I’m
saying (in a notationally-disguised) way that not only are there Cheerios but something
else: a bunch of them. And it’s my ability to talk about not only the particular Cheerios
but also the lot (or bunch or aggregate) of them that enables the increased expressive
power of plural quantification.
Here is another illustration of this important point. Higginbotham (2000, p. 85)
writes:
We can instead regard [(2m)truncated model theory] as merely giving a picture,
within a first-order language, of what is intended, and deny that the values of
predicate variables are objects, construing them instead, as Frege did, as essen-
tially predicational.
One can, indeed, do this. But that’s deserting the Quinean ethics of commitment.
The point, again, is what you have to say. If you deem what you have to say as
not directed to an object, that’s imposing a foreign criterion of ontological commit-
ment (really—a foreign criterion for what exists), and deserting the Quinean one. I
stress again the game in play here: Acceptance of Quine’s criterion is the fundamental
ground-rule, one accepted by Quine (of course) but also by the many opponents of
the strict Quinean criterion.30
Given Quine’s criterion, what commits you is what you have to say. If you say
something about the fusion (or bunch or aggregate or whatever) of Cheerios in addition
30 See the end of Sect. 8 for the possibility of changing the game: deserting Quine’s criterion.
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to what you say about each and all of the Cheerios then you are committed to the bunch
or aggregate or fusion or whatever of Cheerios as well.31
It’s surprising how often philosophers—especially in philosophy of logic or
metaphysics—want something for nothing. But logic forbids this. Plural quantifiers
import increased expressive strength in palpable ways: evading indispensability argu-
ments is one of those. (That’s why plural quantifiers are popular with metaphysicians.)
Why isn’t it obvious—I really want to ask this—that how this expressive strength is
procured is technical, in the sense that what strictly goes beyond first-order resources
can be made explicit? And why isn’t it obvious that once this is made explicit, the
result most likely begs the question against the (strict Quinean) opponent?
6 Lewis on everything
Lewis (1991, pp. 66–68) runs an interesting argument for plural quantification, based
on the “singularist” attempting to interpret what the “pluralist” says. The reinterpre-
tations vigorously sprint up a set-structural hierarchy (moving from sets to proper
classes to “awesome classes,” to, etc., …). Lewis (1991, p. 68) writes:
But let’s cut a long story short. Whatever class-like things there may be together,
holding none in reserve, it seems we can truly say that there are those of them that
are non-self-members. Maybe the singularist replies that some mystical censor
stops us from quantifying over absolutely everything without restriction. Lo, he
violates his own stricture in the very act of proclaiming it! (Italics his)
Lewis adds:
We embrace plural quantification over all the things there are. (Italics his)
The claim is that there is an interpretation of a plural-quantification formalism with
everything as its domain. Can we apply the truncation-model method to this interpre-
tation? Doing so requires an item that appears twice: in the extension of “S” and in
the anti-extension of “S”!
What follows? Well, it isn’t as obvious as Lewis makes it out to be.32 Can we plu-
rally quantify over all the things there are? Are we simultaneously unable to singularly
quantify over all the things there are? To begin with, Quine (e.g., 1986) would demur.
31 The Quinean criterion doesn’t require there be a natural or uniform or even easy way to characterize
in the vernacular the additional commitments plural quantification harbors. For example, there might not
be a simple phrase “bunch,” “group,” “aggregate,” etc., that’s always available to characterize what kind
of thing the vernacular plural-quantifiers induce commitments to. We’re committed all the same according
to the Quinean ethics of ontological commitment. (My thanks to one of the referees for pressing me about
this.)
Notice, despite this, that even commonsensically we recognize that bunches of things do stuff that individuals
don’t do. For example, those apples weighing two pounds isn’t each and every one of those apples weighing
two pounds. (My thanks to a referee for this particular example of the point.)
32 A substantial literature exists on “Absolute Generality” that makes this clear. See Rayo and Uzquiano
(2006) for pertinent articles, as well as earlier cited articles, e.g., McGee (2000) and Williamson (2003).




For his commitments to sets, in particular, goes only so far as the needs of applied
mathematics do, and that involves very little of the set-theoretic hierarchy. More impor-
tantly, Quine’s criterion (strict or otherwise) does not require that quantifiers range
over everything. Additional arguments are needed to force the issue.33 I won’t pursue
this further because philosophers differ with Quine (and each other) on substantial
issues, such as these, while still accepting his criterion—while still accepting the strict
criterion. This paper is concerned—as much as possible—only with philosophers who
accept Quine’s criterion, while dropping Quine’s demand that this criterion be applied
only within first-order formalisms.
There is one important point to make about everything, however. It might seem
a flaw is exposed in truncation-model constructions if we can plurally quantify over
all the things that there are, but can’t singularly quantify over them. But this is the
wrong conclusion. Using paradoxical reasoning, to show the domain of everything can
be plurally quantified over but not singularly quantified over, doesn’t show that the
truncation-model method is flawed. It just shows something already established: plural
quantification masks ontological commitments. The conclusion to draw, therefore, is
that in using plural quantifiers to range over “everything” we simply evade explicit
paradox by forbidding explicit expression (in adopting pluralist formalisms) of addi-
tional ontological commitments that we (nevertheless) incur by plurally quantifying
over what we (falsely) take to be everything.
7 Primitive logical idioms and burdens of proof
Unlike Quine’s (widely rejected) first-order rendition technique which broadly applies
(because it doesn’t respect the metalogical properties of alternative logics), the
truncation-model method looks more demanding because it isn’t technically trans-
parent when it can and can’t be applied. Consider modal logics. Some philosophers
think the modal idioms are logical primitives that therefore have the same effect on
ontological commitments that many similarly urge plural quantification to have: none
whatsoever.34
Suppose that—success with higher-order logics notwithstanding—some modal for-
malism MF (with a semantics) seems resistant to the truncation-model recipe.35 And
suppose there are philosophical proponents of this formalism who claim that taking
MF idioms as primitives evades undesirable ontological commitments while enabling
desirable expressive strengths. Suppose we use the semantics for MF to generate a
rendition of MF in an interpreted first-order formalism. Polemically, unfortunately,
33 For example, that (Williamson 2003, and others) the interpretation of negative existentials requires
their quantifiers range over everything, or (Linnebo 2006), “the semantic argument,” that a scientific and
systematic semantics can’t be open-ended and essentially incomplete. The pure Quinean rejects the latter
claim. (I think he can also reject the former.) Every science is incomplete—to a Quinean. Why is semantics
any different? To pursue this debate further, however, is to tussle over topics outside the scope of this paper.
34 E.g., Field (1989). Notably, David Lewis does not have this view about modal formalisms—he instead
uses the standard truth-conditions for modal logic to induce first-order renditions of modal language that
are in turn evaluated for ontological commitments in just the way Quine’s approach evaluates them.
35 Contrary to my suggestion in footnote 25.
123
Synthese
this leaves the opponent of MF in exactly the same position vis-à-vis MF as Quine
himself is vis-à-vis Boolos—as described in Sect. 2. MF appears to be logic exactly
the way that higher-order logic appears to be logic. A rendition of it in an interpreted
first-order formalism perhaps distorts its metalogical properties. Is the proponent of
Quine’s strict criterion without a response?
No. The proponent can argue this way: Natural-language intuitions about when an
idiom does or doesn’t involve ontological commitment can’t be trusted (as shown by
the success of the of the truncation-model method applied to monadic second-order
logic). We know, therefore, that non-first-order logical idioms can secretively har-
bor ontological commitments undiscovered until notational equivalents reveal them.
Where does this leave us with respect to MF? In philosophical limbo. If non-first-
order logical idioms have additional expressive strengths, they can’t be trusted until
proven innocent. The Quinean, thus, shouldn’t deny that these idioms are innocent of
additional commitments; he should deny that he (or anyone else) knows whether they
are ontologically innocent or not.
Notice this “argument from ignorance” suffices to strip the rationale from programs
that try to escape ontological commitments by using primitive non-first-order logical
idioms. The burden is on the proponent of such programs to show their ontological
innocence.36 One last point. Quine himself (e.g., 1974) took substitutional quantifica-
tion, when it could be implemented, as ontologically innocent. And many philosophers
have agreed. The proponent of Quine’s strict criterion can take a harder line about this
than Quine did. Without a notationally-equivalent construction from a first-order lan-
guage coupled with objectual model-theoretic semantics, the appropriate attitude to
take towards the ontological implications of substitutional quantification is also one
of ignorance.
8 Some conclusions
There are several non-first-order idioms philosophers have adopted—in one or another
quest to escape the first-order straitjacket—arguing (i) that the new ideology isn’t
relevant to ontological commitment while simultaneously (ii) luxuriating in its
suspiciously-rich expressive strength. The quotation from Boolos lists only some of
these non-first-order idioms. In some cases, as I’ve indicated, it’s easy to construct
notational equivalents of these that straightforwardly show in what ways their expres-
sive strength and ontological commitments outrun first-order resources. The results,
invariably, aren’t good news for proponents: the formalisms are not ontologically
innocent. If there are cases, however, where the truncation-model method hasn’t been
shown to apply, the debating situation is delicate. If the proponent of the non-first-order
formalism (foolishly) accepts Quine’s first-order rendition method, then the formalism
can still be convicted of importing additional ontological commitments because of the
additional nonlogical structure of the interpreted first-order theory that the formalism
36 Recall the beginning of Sect. 2: the proponent of Quine’s criterion, too, must explain why the predicates




is rendered in. If, however, the proponent insists the formalism is an alternative logic,
as do proponents of modal logic (or substitutional quantification) who insist that, sim-
ilarly to other logical idioms, the additional idioms are primitives, then the proponent
of Quine’s strict criterion need only point out that primitive logical idioms can harbor
ontological commitments—especially if additional expressive strength results. Igno-
rance about ontological commitments is construed against the opponent of Quine’s
strict criterion.
I end this paper with a more radical suggestion, however. The metaphysical intu-
itions of Black and Boolos about bowls of Cheerios, packs of wolves, and the like,
mentioned in Sect. 5, reveal that we all have strong metaphysical intuitions about what
things there are that come apart from the dictates of Quinean syntactic ethics. So, I
claim, Boolos and Lewis inadvertently make the right point: We can plurally quantify
over Cheerios or wolves or whatever even if there are no sets or fusions or any other
sort of “plural” entity that the Cheerios or wolves or whatever makes up. But it must
be added: And we can singularly quantify without objects! (Just as we do with god-
desses and gods and dreams figures and all other sorts of whatnot.) But this radical
suggestion—rejecting Quine’s criterion entirely—must be explored elsewhere.37
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